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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY SURVEY:
RECUSAL
At the end of this survey article, five Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
judges offer their thoughts and opinions on the subject of judicial recusal. In
general, the participants discuss the policy considerations underlying recusal
motions and the implications of denying or granting these motions.
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit cases regarding judicial ethics during the survey period
focused exclusively on recusal. The term "recusal" refers to the process by
which a judge is disqualified from a case because of self-interest, bias, or
prejudice. The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 455 govern recusal of federal judg-
es.2 Section 455 provides two separate grounds for recusal. First, § 455(a) sets
out the general standard requiring a judge to disqualify himself when "his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."3 Second, § 455(b) lists specific
instances, in addition to situations in which a judge's "impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned," that necessitate recusal.4
Each of the recusal cases that the Tenth Circuit decided during the survey
period involved a motion to recuse based on § 455(a). The analysis of the
1. "[Riecusal ... refers to the process by which a judge is disqualified." BLACK'S LAW
DIcnONARY 1277 (6th ed. 1990); see also Adam J. Safer, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Extraju-
dicial Source Requirement for Judicial Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 15 CARDO Zo
L. REV. 787, 787 n.3 (1993). Canon 3(C) of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Con-
duct governs recusal. A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucT Canon 3(C) (1972).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
3. "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
4. Section 445 (b) provides:
He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed eviden-
tiary facts concerning the proceeding; (2) Where in private practice he served as a law-
yer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law
served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; (3) Where he has served in govern-
mental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser, or material
witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the
particular case in controversy; (4) He knows that he, individually, or as a fiduciary, or
his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (5) He or his spouse, or a per-
son within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such per-
son: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is
acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge's
knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455(b); see also Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualifica-
tion in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1049 (1993) (commenting that § 455(b) may be
seen as a list of per se circumstances requiring recusal in situations involving actual bias rather
than situations involving subsection (a)'s concern with the public's perception of bias).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
surveyed cases focuses primarily on the legislative policies behind the recusal
statute. With that in mind, Part I of this Survey traces the statute's legislative
history, which reflects the principles underlying 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Parts II
through V discuss the four recusal cases that the Tenth Circuit decided during
the survey period.
Part II explores the Tenth Circuit's treatment of judicial biases stemming
from extrajudicial5 sources. In Maez v. Mountain States Telephone & Tele-
graph, Inc.,6 the alleged bias arose from the judge's professional relationship
with the defendant.7 The Tenth Circuit focused on the temporal context of the
relationship and determined that the acquaintanceship did not mandate
recusal.' Part III examines the Tenth Circuit's approach to bias stemming
from intrajudicial9 sources. In United States v. Young,"° the court held that
recusal was unnecessary because the alleged bias stemmed from an
intrajudicial source and the judge did not display a "deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism."' Part IV discusses the implications of the Tenth Circuit's time-
liness requirement for § 455 motions. In United States v. Stenzel,"2 the court
determined that the recusal issue was not preserved for appeal because the
motion to recuse was not timely made. 3 Finally, Part V considers the proper
remedy for a violation of § 455. In King v. Champion,4 the court concluded
that the district judge should have recused himself. The court, however, did
not remand the case because the district judge was not required to make
credibility determinations or determine disputed facts.
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF 28 U.S.C. § 455(A)
Prior to the 1975 amendment, § 455(a) contained a subjective test of the
judge's impartiality. 5 This subjective test, referred to as the "actual partiality
standard," required recusal if the judge himself believed that partiality exist-
ed.'6 Whether other reasonable persons thought the judge appeared biased
5. "Extrajudicial" refers to "[t]hat which is done, given, or effected outside the course of
regular judicial proceedings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 586 (6th ed. 1990).
6. 54 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1995).
7. Maez, 54 F.3d at 1508.
8. Id.
9. "Intrajudicial," conversely, is that which is done, given, or effected within the course of
judicial proceedings.
10. 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2633 (1995).
11. Young, 45 F.3d at 1415.
12. 49 F.3d 658 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 123 (1995).
13. Stenzel, 49 F.3d at 661.
14. 55 F.3d 522, 524 (10th Cir. 1995).
15. Prior to 1975, § 455 provided that:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case
in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a
material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney
as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on trial, appeal, or other
proceeding therein.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1968).
16. Kevin D. Swan, Comment, Protecting the Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in the
Face of Law Clerk Employment Negotiations, 62 WASH. L. REV. 813, 815-16 (1987) (discussing §
455 (a) and Congress's utilization of "a standard of actual impartiality based on the judge's per-
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was immaterial. 7 Commentators contended that the actual partiality standard
did little to encourage public confidence in the judicial system. 8 These critics
reasoned that public perception of impartiality determines the extent of public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and, further, the appearance of bias
was as harmful to this faith as actual bias.' 9
In response to this criticism, the American Bar Association (ABA) intro-
duced an objective standard, or the "appearance of partiality test."20 This test
inquires whether "a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances,
would be led to question the judge's impartiality."'" In 1975, Congress codi-
fied the ABA's objective standard at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).2 2 The codified stan-
dard requires a judge to disqualify himself if his "impartiality may reasonably
be questioned."23 If a reasonable basis exists for the motion, the judge should
recuse himself.24 Congress explained that it replaced the subjective standard
with the objective standard in order to clarify and broaden the grounds for
judicial disqualification and to foster public confidence in the judiciary. 5
ception").
17. Id. at 816. "Section 455 relied upon judges to recuse themselves when certain circum-
stances rendered it improper, in [their] opinion, for them to hear the case." Id.
18. Id.; see also Edward G. Burg, Comment, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial
Disqualification, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1445, 1481-82 (1981); Note, Disqualification of Judges and
Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REv. 736, 764 (1973).
19. Swan, supra note 16, at 816 (stating that "it is the public's perception of neutrality, not
that of the judiciary, which governs the public's faith in the judicial system").
20. A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (1972). Canon 3(C)(1) provides that
"[a] judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." Id.; see also Swan, supra note 16, at 816 (explaining that in response to criticism of
the actual impartiality standard the ABA introduced the appearance of impartiality standard in
1972).
21. A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3(C) (1972); E. Thode, Reporter's notes to
the Code of Judicial Conduct 49 (1973); see also Swan, supra note 16, at 816 ("The test requires
an objective determination of only the appearance of impartiality, not actual impartiality. If a
reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, would be led to question the judge's impar-
tiality the judge should recuse him or herself.").
22. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994). Section 455(a) provides that "[alny justice, judge, or magistrate
of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned." Id; see also Swan, supra note 16, at 816-17 (explaining that once a
judge's impartiality is questioned, the judge decides only whether there is a reasonable basis for
the question).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Supreme Court interpreted the amended § 455(a) in Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988). The Liljeberg court held that
[tihe goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would
appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him
an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no
actual partiality exists because the judge does not recall the facts, because the judge
actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorrupt-
ible.
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860.
24. Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 256-57 (5th Cir.) (noting that
if there is a question about the judge's impartiality, and she finds that the basis for the doubt is
reasonable, she must recuse herself), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6351, 6354-
55 (describing Congress's intent that the amendment support the public's confidence in the impar-
tiality of the judiciary). The Supreme Court further interpreted Congress's intent, stating:
The statute was amended.., to clarify and broaden the grounds for judicial disqualifi-
cation and to conform with the recently adopted ABA Code of Judicial Conduct ....
The general language of subsection (a) was designed to promote public confidence in
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II. BIASES STEMMING FROM ExTRAuDICIAL SOuRCES:
MAEZ V. MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH, INC.
26
A. Background: The Objective Standard in the Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit applies § 455(a)'s objective test in judicial recusal
cases." In United States v. Cooley,8 the court held that when deciding
whether to affirm a judge's denial of a recusal motion, the proper analysis
asks "whether a reasonable person armed with the relevant facts would harbor
doubts about the judge's partiality. '29 The Cooley court explained that the
standard is purely objective and that the "inquiry is limited to outward mani-
festations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom."30 A "reasonable factu-
al basis" for questioning the judge's impartiality, however, must exist.
3'
B. Maez v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, Inc.32
1. Facts
The plaintiffs, former managers at defendant Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph, Inc. (Mountain Bell), appealed a district judge's denial of their
§ 445 motion to recuse.33 The plaintiffs contended that the judge should have
recused himself due to his association with Mountain Bell.3 4 Specifically, the
judge previously worked for Mountain Bell from 1955 through the early
1960s, had served for one year as Mountain Bell's in-house legal staff, had
special knowledge of the internal workings of Mountain Bell, and had a pro-
fessional acquaintance with Mountain Bell's general counsel.3" The judge
personally knew one of the defendants, and had business associations with
other defendants dating back twenty years.36 The district judge held that there
was an insufficient basis for a reasonable person to be concerned that the
the integrity of the judicial process by replacing the subjective "in his opinion" standard
with an objective test.
Liljeberg, 468 U.S. at 858 n.7 (citations omitted).
26. 54 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1995).
27. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2250 (1995); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 114 (1994); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
28. 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993). The Cooley judge's participation in a television interview
by Barbara Walters mandated recusal when, during the course of the interview, the judge dis-
cussed the abortion protest which was at issue in the case. Cooley, I F.3d at 995.
29. Id. at 993.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 54 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1995).
33. Maez, 54 F.3d at 1495.





judge "might be biased or prejudiced with respect to [the] claims of any of the
parties or counsel."37
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, refusing to find an abuse of discretion in the
district judge's denial of the motion to recuse.3s After reiterating the objective
test set forth in Cooley, the court held that the requisite doubts were not raised
merely because the judge "worked for or even represented Mountain Bell
some thirty years ago and may have socialized with fellow Mountain Bell
employees."39 The court noted that this particular judge had heard three prior
cases involving claims and allegations against Mountain Bell where counsel
(in all three cases) had perceived no "appearance of impartiality."
4
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Maez reflects the practical realities in the
judicial process and the legal profession. One such reality is that a judge will
inevitably have numerous social and professional relationships.4 ' A judge fre-
quently exploits these professional relationships to obtain judicial office. In
practice, a judge will not terminate these relationships or social connections
once appointed. 42 A judge's responsibility to set aside personal biases and
rule impartially is an inherent requirement of the job; a different rule would
require recusal in a prohibitive number of cases. These practical limitations
must be weighed against the risk of harm to public confidence in the judicial
system created by the appearance of a partial judiciary.
The Maez court reasoned that "there is as much obligation for a judge not
to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do
so when there is." '43 Prior to the 1975 amendment of § 455(a), case law inter-
preting the statute implied a "duty to sit."" Thus, in the past judges chose to
err on the side of hearing the case when counsel questioned their impartiali-
ty.4 5 Congress's amendment of § 455 in 1975, however, included an explicit
repudiation of this duty to sit.' In proposing the amendment, the House
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1508.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. A New York court recently addressed this issue in a high-profile case involving Andy
Warhol's estate. Hayes v. The Andy Warhol Foundation, 637 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996). The chief beneficiary of the estate claimed that the judge was a social acquaintance of the
lawyer of the estate. Id. The court, however, deemed the motion to recuse "belated," and denied it.
Id.
42. See Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1117 (4th Cir. 1988) (com-
menting that "litigants are entitled to a judge free of personal bias, but not to a judge without any
personal history before appointment to the bench"), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989).
43. Maez, 54 F.3d at 1508 (quoting Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987)).
44. Swan, supra note 16, at 816 (noting that cases interpreting § 455 inferred a "duty to sit,"
and judges presumed that they should hear a case unless it would be improper to do so).
45. Id. (stating that "in a situation where there were only doubts about their impartiality,
judges would err on the side of hearing the case"); see Harold S. Levy, Judicial Recusals, 2 PACE
L. REv. 35, 46 (1982).
46. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in U.S.S.C.A.N. 6351, 6354-55.
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Judiciary Committee disclaimed the duty to sit by specifically requiring adju-
dication of close or questionable cases in favor of recusal.' Thus, the Tenth
Circuit's reference to such a duty may be inconsistent with congressional
intent.
D. Other Circuits
The Maez refusal to mandate recusal for the judge's mere familiarity with
the party is consistent with case law in other circuits. The First, Second,
Fourth, and Federal Circuits have upheld the denial of a recusal motion when
the relationship giving rise to the alleged bias terminated some time ago.'
III. BIASES STEMMING FROM INTRAJUDICIAL SOURCES:
UNITED STATES V. YOUNG
49
A. Background
Sections 14450 and 455(b)5 govern recusal of federal judges.52 Under
§§ 144 and 455(b)(1), the judge's personal bias or prejudice must stem from
outside the course of regular judicial proceedings. 3 The legal community
(1974). With the adoption of the new § 455, Congress removed the duty to sit. Id. Now a judge
should seek to "err on the side of caution and [recuse] himself in a questionable case."
Postashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
820 (1981); see also Swan, supra note 16, at 817 (explaining that the new § 455 repudiates the
duty to sit and requires that judges decide doubtful cases on the side of caution and recusal).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1453.
48. United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 817 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that because the
judge's relationship with the party ended seven or eight years prior to sentencing, the judge did
not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself); In re Allied Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 974, 976
(1st Cir. 1989) (holding that a business relationship between the judge and the lawyer that took
place eight years prior to the case, and before the judge's appointment, did not cast significant
doubt on the judge's impartiality); Simkins Indus., 847 F.2d at 1117 (noting that the judge's brief
association with the Sierra Club that terminated over a decade before adversary proceedings com-
menced did not form the basis for reasonably questioning a district judge's impartiality); Maier v.
Onf, 758 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that a trial judge's former association with
the Air Force did not reasonably raise appearance of partiality); Brody v. President & Fellow of
Harvard College, 664 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that a trial judge's graduation from the
defendant university did not in itself constitute a reasonable basis for recusal motion), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1027 (1982).
49. 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2633 (1995).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994). As with § 455, this statute applies if a judge has a personal
bias or prejudice towards a party. Id. Section 144 mandates that the party file a timely recusal
motion along with an affidavit stating the facts that suggest the judge's personal bias. Id. When
faced with a § 144 motion to recuse, the judge rules on the legal sufficiency of the motion but not
on the truth of the matters alleged. The affidavit is sufficient if the facts alleged, assuming that
they are true, would convince a reasonable person that bias exists. Id.; see Abramson, supra note
4, at 1050 n.l I (commenting on the procedure for filing a § 144 motion).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (1994).
52. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455.
53. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (explaining that in a mo-
tion for disqualification under § 144, "[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must
stem from an extrajudicial source"); United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that the extrajudicial source limitation applies to §§ 144 and 455(b)(1)), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 916 (1982); Lori M. McPherson, Liteky v. United States: The Supreme Court Restricts the
Disqualification of Biased Federal Judges Under Section 455(a), 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 1427, 1432-
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refers to this requirement as the extrajudicial source doctrine. 4 However, be-
cause § 455(a) does not contain the phrase "personal bias and prejudice," cir-
cuit courts are divided over whether the extrajudicial source requirement ex-
tends to § 455(a)." This confusion exists within the Tenth Circuit: the limita-
tion has been applied inconsistently to § 455(a) motions.5 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Liteky v. United States5 7 to re-
solve the inconsistent decisions among the circuit courts regarding whether §
455(a) was subject to the same extrajudicial source limitation as §
455(b)(1)." The Supreme Court held that the word "personal" in the phrase
"personal bias and prejudice" in § 455(b)(1) did not form the basis of the
extrajudicial source limitation. Rather, the limitation originated from the
33 (1994) ("The statutory 'home' of the extrajudicial source doctrine ... was the phrase 'personal
bias and prejudice' found in section 144. Because section 455(b)(1) also contains the personal bias
and prejudice language of section 144, the extrajudicial source requirement was universally ex-
tended to section 455(b)(1)."); Safer, supra note 1; Serena Viswanathan, Project: Twenty-Fourth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-
1994, 83 GEO. L.J. 1144, 1145-48 (1995) (explaining that §§ 144 and 455(b)(1) provide for
recusal when the judge has a bias stemming from an extrajudicial source).
54. One example of a motion to recuse originating from an intrajudicial source appears in a
high-profile New York state case involving the $1.2 billion estate of tobacco heiress Doris Duke.
The movants claimed the facts necessitated recusal because the judge created an appearance of
impropriety when he removed the movants as co-executors in a prior meeting. In re Will of Duke,
632 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
55. United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1022 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that "unlike
challenges under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144, the source of the asserted bias/prejudice in a Section 455(a)
claim can originate explicitly in judicial proceedings"); United States v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789,
791 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that recusal under § 455(a) must be predicated on extrajudicial con-
duct); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that bias must derive from extraju-
dicial source); Davis v. Board of Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that §
455(a) contained the extrajudicial source doctrine), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); see
McPherson, supra note 53, at 1428-33 (explaining the origin of the confusion in the circuit
courts).
56. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 994 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting the inconsis-
tencies in the Tenth Circuit regarding application of the extrajudicial source doctrine); United
States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1481 (10th Cir.) (stating that the extrajudicial source rules apples
to § 455(a) and § 455(b)(1)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987); Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230,
1234 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the extrajudicial source rule applies to § 455(b)(1), but hold-
ing nothing specific as to § 455(a)); United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 728 (10th Cir. 1982)
(stating that § 455 (b)(1) requires recusal for actual bias, but that subsection (a) requires it for the
mere appearance of impartiality).
57. 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994). In 1991, the government charged petitioners with willful de-
struction of federal property, for spilling human blood on various objects at the Fort Benning
Military reservation. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150. Before trial, the petitioners moved to disqualify
the district judge pursuant to § 455(a). Id. The motion was based on events that had occurred
during and after a trial in 1983 involving the same petitioner and the same judge. Id. at 1150-51.
In the earlier trial, the petitioner, a Catholic priest, was convicted of various misdemeanors com-
mitted during protest action. Id. at 1151. Petitioner claimed that recusal was necessary in the 1991
case because the judge had displayed impatience and animosity towards the petitioner and his
beliefs. Id. The judge denied the motion to recuse, reasoning that matters arising out of judicial
proceedings were not the proper basis for recusal. Id. The petitioners were convicted and appealed,
claiming the judge violated § 455(a) by refusing to recuse himself. Id. The Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed, agreeing that matters arising out of the course of judicial proceedings are not the proper
basis for recusal. Id.
58. Id. at 1150; see McPherson, supra note 53, at 1434 (noting that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the inconsistent circuit decisions).
59. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1154. The Court stated:
1996]
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connotations of the words "bias and prejudice."6 The Court then held that
although § 455 does not expressly include this statutory language, the word
"partiality" has the same negative connotation as the words "bias and preju-
dice."' The Court concluded that the basis for a § 455(a) motion to recuse
should stem from an extrajudicial source.62
The Court, however, did indicate a possible exception to the extrajudicial
source requirement. A bias stemming from an intrajudicial source may consti-
tute the basis for a § 455(a) motion to recuse if it displays "a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."63
Therefore, the Court concluded that generally neither a judge's critical, disap-
proving, or hostile remarks during judicial proceedings, nor her expressions of
impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, or anger, mandate recusal.
B. United States v. Young65
1. Facts
Laina Young appealed a conviction on two counts of money laundering,
contending that the district judge erred by denying her § 455(a) recusal mo-
tion.' The grounds for the motion included comments made by the judge
during the scheduling conference regarding Young's "obvious" fate in the tri-
al.67 Young claimed that the judge's remarks demonstrated an inappropriate
bias against her such that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned"
under § 455(a).'
In our view ... the basis of the modem "extrajudicial source" doctrine, is not the statu-
tory term "personal". Bias and prejudice seem to us not divided into the "personal"
kind, which is offensive, and the official kind, which is perfectly all right. As generally
used, these are pejorative terms, describing dispositions that are never appropriate ....
[li]nterpreting the term "personal" to create a complete dichotomy between court-ac-
quired and extrinsically acquired bias produces results so intolerable as to be absurd.
Imagine ... a lengthy trial in which the presiding judge for the first time learns of an
obscure religious sect, and acquires a passionate hatred for all its adherents. This would
be "official" rather than "personal" bias and would provide no basis for the judge's re-
cusing himself.
Id.
60. Id. at 1155.
61. Id. at 1155-56.
62. Id. at 1156.
63. Id. at 1157. The court provided an example of deep-seated antagonism by referring to a
World War II espionage case against German-American defendants where the court depicted their
hearts as "reeking with disloyalty." Id.
64. Id.
65. 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1995).
66. Young, 45 F.3d at 1414.
67. Id. at 1414-15. The judge's controversial remarks were:
And bear in mind this: that the obvious thing that's going to happen to Ms. Young is
that she's going to get convicted, and then they're going to sprinkle her and bless her
with immunity, and then she's going to get to testify. And then she's going to pull the
same act on me again, and then she's going to county jail for at least 30 if not 60 or 90
days for contempt.
Id. at 1414.




On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the judge's remarks in the schedul-
ing conference did not require recusal. 9 Relying on the Supreme Court's re-
cent interpretation of § 455(a) in Liteky,"° the court concluded that since the
judge did not express this opinion based upon knowledge gathered outside the
course of judicial proceedings, and since the comments, viewed in the context
of the case, did not display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgement impossible, recusal was unwarranted.7 The court rea-
soned that while the comments reflected the judge's belief that the jury would
likely convict Young, they did not indicate that the judge could not fulfill his
responsibilities impartially.72
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Young made a significant contribution to
the analysis of recusal cases by clarifying the grounds for a § 455(a) motion to
recuse. Specifically, Young marks the Tenth Circuit's extension of the extraju-
dicial source requirement to § 455(a) in accordance with the Supreme Court's
decision in Liteky. This requirement invalidates § 455(a) motions based on
bias deriving from an intrajudicial source, unless it is so extreme that it re-
veals a "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism" that renders executing a fair
judgment impossible. Thus, Young demonstrates the Tenth Circuit's belief that
statements of opinion by the judge based on knowledge gathered in the course
of judicial proceedings should be analyzed differently than similar statements
originating from extrajudicial sources.
The court treats extrajudicial and intrajudicial biases differently because of
practical realities inherent in the judiciary. Specifically, the extrajudicial source
rule recognizes that judges naturally form opinions about the parties based
upon the information obtained in the course of judicial proceedings.73 Thus, it
would be unrealistic to expect the judge in Young not to have formed opinions
about what the jury would likely conclude.
Furthermore, applying the extrajudicial source limitation to § 455(a) de-
creases the risk that the parties might use the recusal process to disqualify one
69. Id. at 1416.
70. For a discussion of Liteky v. United States, see supra notes 57-64 and accompanying
text.
71. Young, 45 F.3d at 1416.
72. Id.
73. The Fifth Circuit expressed this idea in their explanation of the extrajudicial source rule:
[A] judge is not merely a passive observer. He must... shrewdly observe the strategies
of the opposing lawyers, perceive their efforts to sway him by appeals to his predilec-
tions. He must cannily penetrate through the surface of their remarks to their real pur-
poses and motives. He has an official obligation to become prejudiced in that sense.
Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If
the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court house dramas called trials,
he could never render decisions.
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 325 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting In re
I.B.M. Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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judge in order to obtain a judge whose disposition is more favorable to their
position. In fact, Congress recognized this potential for "judge-shopping.""
The report advised courts to avoid interpreting the statute in such a way that a
party's fear of an adverse ruling would be treated as a reasonable questioning
of the judge's impartiality.75
The Young court did not address whether a reasonable person, armed with
the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's partiality. The Court
declined to apply this objective standard because the alleged bias did not stem
from an extrajudicial source. In effect, the extrajudicial source rule replaces
the statute's objective test with the "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism"
standard if the alleged predisposition originates from facts adduced at trial.76
Thus, the extension of the extrajudicial source requirement to § 455(a) nar-
rowed the grounds available for recusal. Such constriction, however, conflicts
with the policy underlying the recusal statute." By amending § 455(a) in
1975 to encompass an objective test, Congress intended to promote public
confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process by broadening and clari-
fying the grounds for recusal.78 The Tenth Circuit's narrow interpretation of §
455(a), however, may weaken the public's faith in the judiciary by ruling
against recusal, despite the fact that the judge's "impartiality may reasonably
be questioned." This is particularly true where the alleged bias stems from an
intrajudicial source but does not reach the level of "deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism."79
D. Other Circuits
The full impact of Liteky's extension of the extrajudicial source rule to §
455(a) remains unclear. The Seventh Circuit recently denied a § 455(a) recusal
claim despite the judge's predisposition in the case because he did not display
the "deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment
74. H. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6351, 6355
(1974). "Litigants ought not have to face a judge where there is a reasonable question of impar-
tiality, but they are not entitled to judges of their own choice." Id. Judges "must be alert to avoid
the possibility that those who would question [their] impartiality are in fact seeking to avoid the
consequences of [the judges] expected adverse decision." Id.
75. Id.
76. See McPherson, supra note 53, at 1445-46 (commenting that the Court has substituted
the "impossibility of fair judgment" standard for the statute's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned" standard).
77. Id. at 1446 (commenting that the interpretation defeats the purpose for which the statute
was enacted and sounds the "death-knell" on the broad protections that § 455 seeks to provide).
78. H.R. REP. No. 1453. The Supreme Court explained that
[tlhe statute was amended to clarify and broaden the grounds for judicial disqualification
and to conform with the recently adopted ABA Code of Judicial Conduct .... The
general language of subsection (a) was designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process by replacing the subjective "in his opinion" standard
with an objective test.
Liljeberg, 468 U.S. at 858.
79. Safer, supra note 1, at 812 (remarking that allowing an apparently biased judge to try the
case does not promote public confidence in the judiciary, and to suggest otherwise implies that the
public would be more confident if an apparently biased judge presided over the case, rather than if
the judge were disqualified).
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impossible.""s There is still some uncertainty as to how circuits will apply the
"deep-seated favoritism or antagonism" standard to recusal cases involving
biases stemming from intrajudicial sources.
IV. PRESERVING RECUSAL FOR APPELLATE REVIEW:
UNITED STATES V. STENZEL 8'
A. Background
A motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 may be filed at any time.82
Section 455 also provides a guideline for the judge to decide when self-recusal
is necessary. 3 Thus, either the judge or a litigant may assert a § 455 motion
to recuse. The Tenth Circuit requires that the party make a § 455 motion in a
timely manner in order to obtain review.84 Once it grants review, the court of
appeals determines whether the trial judge abused her discretion by denying
the recusal motion.85
B. United States v. Stenzel 6
1. Facts
Robert Stenzel was convicted under the Assimilative Crimes Act 7 for
"concealing his identity, disorderly conduct, failure to exhibit evidence of
financial responsibility, and failure to exhibit evidence of vehicle registra-
tion." 8 During the trial, the district court judge informed the parties that he
had been stationed at the military base where the criminal acts occurred, and
that he had recently been the Honorary Commander of the Air National
Guard.89 Mr. Stenzel's counsel asked the judge whether he felt that this
80. In re Huntington Commons Assoc., 21 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1994).
81. 49 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 1995).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
83. Id.
84. Wilner v. University of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that the
recusal motion was not timely when plaintiff moved for recusal four and one-half years into the
case), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031 (1989); Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984)
(noting that party seeking recusal failed to act in a timely fashion), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028
(1985).
85. United States v. Cooley, I F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Burger, 964
F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 114 (1994); Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l,
Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1987).
86. 49 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 1995).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). The Assimilative Crimes Act provides federal jurisdiction for
state crimes committed on federal property. Id.
88. Stenzel, 49 F.3d at 659.
89. Id. at 661. The record states:
Q: And that's the Wyoming gate at Kirtland where this incident allegedly occurred, is
that correct?
A.: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: For the record, I'm well acquainted with the base. I was stationed there
years ago and I have also recently been the Honorary Commander of the Air Force
National Guard, so I know what it is.
MS. ROSENSTEIN [Stenzel's counsel]: I was unaware of that, Your Honor. Does the
Court feel that that would be an apparent conflict?
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"would be an apparent conflict."' The judge responded that it would not be a
conflict, and Mr. Stenzel's counsel replied, "Okay."' On appeal, Mr. Stenzel
contended that the district court judge erred in not recusing himself due to his
relationship with the military.92
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court held that the conversation between the district
court judge and Mr. Stenzel's counsel about a possible conflict of interest did
not constitute a request for recusal.93 Additionally, the court noted that Mr.
Stenzel's counsel did not develop, in the record, any basis for disqualification
of the district judge.94 Consequently, Mr. Stenzel did not make a timely ob-
jection, and the recusal issue was not preserved for appeal."
C. Analysis
Stenzel confirms the Tenth Circuit's timeliness requirement regarding §
455 motions to recuse. Timeliness preserves judicial resources by limiting the
issues reviewed on appeal. Furthermore, a contrary decision may encourage
litigants to manipulate the judicial process by delaying motions to recuse to
"wait and see" whether judgment will be in favor of the opposing party.
Congress's concern with "judge shopping" is equally relevant upon the trial's
completion.96 Although the equities do not favor the losing party requesting
recusal after an adverse judgment, the timeliness requirement creates an in-
herent risk that the litigant will be denied the fight to a neutral and impartial
judge. In Stenzel, the Court never analyzed whether a reasonable person would
harbor doubts about the district judge's partiality because the recusal issue was
not preserved for appellate review. A possibility therefore exists that recusal
was necessary and that the failure to recuse may have denied Mr. Stenzel his
fight to an impartial tribunal. The timeliness requirement seems particularly
unfair in Stenzel, where counsel had previously expressed concern that the
judge might have a conflict of interest.
D. Other Circuits
The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have also held that failure to file
a timely recusal motion bars the party from claiming on appeal that the judge
was biased.97 The Third and Ninth Circuits, however, have held that failure to





92. Id. at 660-61.
93. Id. at 661.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See discussion supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
97. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that defendant must
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file a timely recusal motion in the trial court does not constitute waiver of the
claim, but results in a higher burden of proof on appeal. 9 Additionally, some
circuits have distinguished between recusal motions based on the appearance
of impartiality and motions based on actual bias, imposing a timeliness re-
quirement only on the motions based on the appearance of impartiality.99
V. REMEDIES: KING V. CHAMPION'0
A. Background
Section 455 does not specify the proper remedy upon a finding that the
trial judge issued an erroneous recusal decision,' which leaves the task of
constructing a remedy for a violation of § 455(a) to the judiciary. The Su-
preme Court, in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., offers some
direction." 2 The Liljeberg Court advised that when determining whether to
vacate a judgment for a violation of § 455, a court should "consider the risk of
injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief
will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's
confidence in the judicial process."'0 3
B. King v. Champion"°
1. Facts
Oklahoman Doyle Kent King was convicted in state court of "assault and
battery with intent to commit a felony."'0 5 After appealing his conviction,
King filed a habeas petition in federal court, claiming that the delay in adjudi-
cating his appeal violated his constitutional right to due process."°6 The court
joined Mr. King's habeas case together with other similar habeas cases and
referred to the group as the "Harris cases."'0 7 A panel of three federal dis-
trict judges presided over the factually similar cases.'
object to bias in a pre-trial motion to recuse before trial or as soon as alleged bias is discovered),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995); United States v. Bauer, 19 F.3d 409, 414 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that § 455 claims "will not be considered unless timely made"); United States v. York,
888 F.2d 1050, 1053-56 (5th Cir. 1989) (construing § 455 to require timeliness); see supra note
41 (noting a denial of a motion to recuse due to "belatedness" in a high-profile case involving
Andy Warhol's estate).
98. United States v. Bosh, 951 F.2d 1546, 1548-49 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
989 (1992); United States v. Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534, 536 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843
(1979).
99. United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1539-41 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1012 (1986); Unites States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1094-95 (lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1050 (1984).
100. 55 F.3d 522 (10th Cir. 1995).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
102. 486 U.S. 847, 863-64 (1988).
103. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864.
104. 55 F.3d 522 (10th Cir. 1995).
105. King, 55 F.3d at 523.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994).
108. King, 55 F.3d at 523.
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One of the panel judges, Judge Brett, also presided over an evidentiary
hearing concerning King's case. °" Judge Brett determined that King's evi-
dence was insufficient, and denied King's petition for habeas relief."' King
appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief and also insisted that Judge
Brett erred by not recusing himself from the evidentiary hearing."' Because
Judge Brett's uncle was a member of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals during the period of excessive time delay alleged in many of the Harris
cases, King argued on appeal that Judge Brett was required to recuse himself
under § 455."2 Furthermore, the Harris civil rights claims named Judge
Brett's uncle as a party."3
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that Judge Brett should have recused himself from
the habeas action pursuant to § 455.' '4 The court also held, however, that the
judge's failure to recuse himself did not necessitate vacating the judge's opin-
ion."' The court reasoned that a vacation of the judgment and remand were
unnecessary since further delay would only add to the injuries that King alleg-
edly suffered due to the state court delays." 6 The court also justified its con-
clusion by explaining that Judge Brett based his decision on the delay claim
almost entirely on undisputed facts, and the resolution of the case at the evi-
dentiary hearing did not require him to make any credibility determina-
tions."7
C. Analysis
King represents the Tenth Circuit's position that absent credibility issues
or disputed facts, a new trial is not the proper remedy."' Arguably, in a case
where the judge is not compelled to determine which version of the facts is
true, or who has told the truth, impartiality is less crucial and a new trial
might waste judicial resources and entail unnecessary duplication.
The issue that the Tenth Circuit faced in King is directly attributable to
Congress's failure to specify appropriate remedial measures for violations of §
455. Despite the holding in King, the principles underlying § 455 suggest that
if recusal were necessary at the trial level, the appropriate remedial measure






114. Id. at 524. The court reached this conclusion by relying on Harris, which found that
Judge Brett should have recused himself but holding that his failure to do so did not require vaca-
tion of the panel's decision. Id. (citing Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1572 (10th Cir. 1994)).
Rather, the proper remedial action was for the judge to recuse himself from all further proceedings







Congress's recognition that the appearance of impartiality is as damaging to
the public confidence in the judicial process as actual bias. Thus, Congress
drafted the statute to inhibit both actual bias and the appearance of bias. If the
statute exists to avoid even the appearance of impartiality, it appears inconsis-
tent to limit the determination of an appropriate remedy to an examination of
what the district court judge was actually required to do at the trial.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history of § 455 reveals that Congress intended to establish
an objective standard designed to promote public confidence in the integrity of
the judicial process. The recusal statute attempts to preserve this confidence by
protecting one of the underlying principles of the American judicial system,
the right to an impartial tribunal.
The Tenth Circuit's case law regarding motions to recuse based on §
455(a) illustrates the court's reluctance to overturn the denial of a motion to
recuse at the district court level. In three of the four cases handed down on
this issue during the survey period, the court found recusal unnecessary. In the
remaining case, the court found recusal appropriate, but did not remand or
vacate the decision. The decisions as a whole reflect the Tenth Circuit's long-
standing belief that § 455(a) "must not be so broadly construed that it be-
comes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon the merest
unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice."" 
9
Ultimately, the judge with the alleged prejudice knows whether or not the
bias exists. Regardless of the judge's perception, the litigant and the general
public believe that the litigant is being deprived of a fair trial. In this way, the
effect of the Tenth Circuit's tolerance for the appearance of partiality may
ultimately be to injure the public confidence in the essential fairness and integ-
rity of the judicial system.
Amy J. Shimek
119. United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 729 (10th Cir. 1982).
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